Maritime Cyber Security Analysis – How to Reduce Threats? by Ivan Mraković & Ranko Vojinović
132 Ivan Mraković and Ranko Vujinoć: Maritime Cyber Security Analysis – How to Reduce Threats?
Mediterranean University, Faculty of Information Technologies, Podgorica, 
Montenegro
e-mail: iwanmrak@gmail.com
Maritime cyber security management requires a holistic 
approach as there is an increase in complexity, digitalization, 
and automation of systems in maritime industry. Numerous 
interconnected systems between ship and shore, which are in 
need of a special focus in the internet environment, are increasing 
on daily basis. Nowadays one of the major concerns in maritime 
computing is vulnerability to cyber-attacks. In maritime industry, 
cyber incidents can lead to loss of life, loss of control over ships or 
sensitive data, as well as ship and/or cargo hijacking. This paper 
therefore covers key problems of maritime industry from cyber 
security perspective and proposes solutions on how to eliminate 
or minimize them. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Maritime business is rapidly changing. The number of 
integrated and interconnected systems, as well as those where a 
company can access and operate from shore, is rapidly increasing. 
The term “maritime” refers to ships, yachts, offshore structures, 
other floating objects, infrastructure, and anything else that 
connects and unifies all of the afore mentioned elements in 
business. 
Cloud computing is flourishing as well. It brings an 
increase in productivity, scalability, and a significant degree of 
independence of user location, able to  access database from any 
location via internet connection. “Many organizations are now 
migrating towards cloud due to its favorable features” (Balobaid 
and Debnath, 2018). 
As an example, the shipping company “UASC” have 
migrated to a system for bunker ordering via cloud computing. 
The “classic” way of bunker ordering was inexpensive, so the 
representatives of “UASC” moved a step forward, signing the 
contract with “Shiptech” in order to create a cloud based bunker 
ordering platform. Migrating to the new system enables “UASC” 
to track market prices, to have a better communication with 
suppliers, to improve the ship’s performance monitoring and to 
plan bunkering of their whole fleet (Shiptech, 2015).
There is no company or ship operating totally or partly 
online which is immune to cyber threats. Research (Einsig, 2016) 
shows that business digitalization is obstructed by many factors. 
The biggest threat is security vulnerability, especially cyber 
security. In the end, cyber incidents are ranked as the second 
most important risk of running a company. In maritime shipping, 
31% of respondents have stated that they are frightened of 
cyber-criminal, data theft, and other similar risks (Allianz Global 
Corporate & Specialty SE, 2018).This work is licensed under
doi: 10.7225/toms.v08.n01.013
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„Maritime cyber risk refers to a measure of the extent 
to which a technology asset is threatened by a potential 
circumstance or event, which may result in shipping-related 
operational, safety, or security failures as a consequence of 
information or systems being corrupted, lost or compromised” 
(International Maritime Organization, Guidelines on maritime 
cyber risk management, MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3, 2017).
The increase of cyber risks is a consequence of an increase 
in connectivity and dependency of global navigational systems. 
Therefore “cyber security refers to the protection of information 
systems (hardware, software, and associated infrastructure), the 
data on them, and the services they provide, from unauthorized 
access, harm or misuse. This includes harm caused intentionally 
by the operator of the system, or accidentally, as a result of failing 
to follow security procedures“ (Shaikh, 2017).
Vulnerable systems onboard include the navigation 
bridge, cargo handling equipment, the engine room, the 
power management system, and administrative as well as 
communicational systems. Numerous systems onboard which 
could be attacked are represented on Figure 1. 
Figure 1.
Connectivity between ship’s systems – all of them represent potential  targets (Ording, 2019).
Risk management is fundamental for safe and secure 
maritime operations and it should adapt to the world of 
digitalization, automation, and interconnected businesses 
(International Maritime Organization, Guidelines on maritime 
cyber risk management, MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3, 2017).
In the following sections we review the most common 
forms of cyber-attacks in maritime industry, the most important 
threats and ways of defending upon them with a focus on ship’s 
infrastructure and operations. 
2. INTERNATIONAL REGULATION AND GUIDELINES
Upon analyzing literature sources we have arrived at the 
conclusion that many maritime transport participants, in the 
first-place regulatory bodies and international organizations, are 
taking part and offering different solutions for dealing with cyber 
threats in maritime industry. 
The common feature of all analyzed sources is setting risk 
assessment as a first step towards protection from unwanted 
consequences. 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
brings „NIST Framework“ which is widely used as approach 
to cyber security assessment, as well as a step towards  the 
fulfillment of cyber risk management. The advantage of “NIST 
framework” lies in its universality and flexibility, which is why it 
can be employed in many industries, including the maritime one 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST, 2018). 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has taken 
decisive steps in order to solve and control maritime cyber risks. 
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Figure 2.
Flow of adequate approach to cyber security problem onboard (DNV-GL, 2016).
Actually, Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) and The Facilitation 
Committee (FAL) have issued “Guidelines on maritime cyber risk 
management” (MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3) as an answer to the increased 
number of cyber-attacks. The Guidelines completely accept NIST 
framework with five key elements: identification, protection, 
detection, response, and recovery (International Maritime 
Organization, Guidelines on maritime cyber risk management, 
MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3, 2017). 
There is also a Resolution numbered as MSC.428(98) – 
“Maritime Cyber Risk Management in Safety Management 
Systems“. This Resolution encourages flag states to force the 
companies to treat cyber security management at company level 
through “Safety Management System” (SMS) as the requirement 
of “International Safety Management Code” (ISM). Such a 
requirement should be fulfilled no later than first annual ISM 
verification after 1.1.2021. (International Maritime Organization, 
Maritime cyber risk management in safety management systems, 
MSC.428(98), 2017). If the companies fail to implement  the 
required measures, their ships could be detained by Port State 
Control (PSC), thereby causing additional costs and business 
losses.
The IMO have developed a Strategic plan (International 
Maritime Organization, Strategic plan for the organization for 
the six-year period (2018 to 2023), A 30/Res.1110, 2017) for the 
period between 2018 and 2023 where the need for an integration 
between the existing and new technologies in the regulatory 
process is recognized, aiming at balancing benefits between 
security, safety, and environmental protection as well as the 
influence on personnel both onboard and ashore. 
For the same purpose the Baltic and International Maritime 
Councils (BIMCO) in (BIMCO, 2017) rely on publications of NIST 
and IMO. The BIMCO’s attitude is published as „Guidelines on 
Cyber Security Onboard Ships“. BIMCO approaches to cyber risk 
problems through the following items: 1-identification of threats 
and vulnerabilities, 2-assesment of risk exposure, 3-development 
of protection and detection measures, 4-establishment of 
contingency plans to respond and recover upon a cyber security 
incident. 
In “Code of Practice – Cyber Security for Ships” (Boyes, H. and 
Isbell, 2017) cyber risk problems are solved without reliance on 
the afore mentioned NIST framework. Actually the development 
of cyber risk management plan should rely upon cyber risk 
security assessment, which remind us of the fundaments of 
“International Ship and Port Facility Security Code” (ISPS) dealing 
with  general security onboard ships and at port facilities.
All that has been stated above is complemented by 
numerous classification societies which are publishing guidelines 
in order to direct their clients towards the right path. In (DNV-
GL, 2016), the most important classification society „DNVGL“, 
taking into consideration the IMO’s and BIMCO’s guidelines, as 
well as NIST framework, defines three factors as key elements in 
order to improve cyber security: 1-assessment, 2-improvement, 
3-verification, followed by validation.
TRANSACTIONS ON MARITIME SCIENCE 135Trans. marit. sci. 2019; 13: 132-139
“DNVGL” relies on Deming circle, namely „PDCA“ cycle, as it 
is trying to induce maritime transport participants to continually 
asses their current risk using the risk matrix and other methods, 
with a view to creating a productive and proactive system (Figure 
2). Due to a rapid technology development, cyber security 
assessment should not rely only upon the well-known risks. On 
the contrary, it requires a predictive and proactive approach 
which takes into account all systems onboard and ashore, their 
design, interconnection, and management manner. 
In repetitive „PDCA“ cycle, the human factor must be 
acknowledged as equally important as all other business aspects 
- “the desired behavior and awareness in terms of cyber security 
therefore needs to be evaluated just like any other objective” 
(DNV-GL, 2016). 
The latest regulation, which will certainly have a great 
impact on shipping companies, is EU “General Data Protection 
Regulation” (GDPR) which came into force in May, 2018. GDPR 
forces shipping companies to conduct an assessment of impact 
on personal privacy at any time when there is an increased risk 
of privacy violation. Companies are obliged to report any system 
violation within 72 hours in order to enable the entire industry to 
react quickly upon potential cyber-attacks (EUGDPR.org, 2018).
However, the insurance against the cyber related risks is 
still unrecognized for the maritime industry sector. The hull and 
machinery insurance (H&M) policies exclude cyber related risks 
by inserting relevant clauses, such as Cyber Attack Exclusion 
Clause (CL380), while Protection and Indemnity Insurance (P&I) 
offer pools with a limit of $30 million USD per ship in case of 
cyber-attacks which are not related to war or terrorist attack 
activities (Lagouvardou, 2018).
3. HISTORIC REVIEW OF MARITIME CYBER-ATTACKS
The exact number of maritime cyber-attacks is unknown 
and can be considered to be much greater than reported, as 
attacks are frequently unnoticed or companies do not want to 
publish such information in order not to endanger their business 
or frighten their customers. 
In the recent era a set of attacks has resulted in data, system, 
and equipment breaches, as well as serious financial losses. 
Depending on the kind of attack, consequences vary from minor 
to moderate, such as in the case of data theft, while in the case of 
taking control over the whole system, for instance a vessel, they 
seem to be reaching catastrophic levels. 
Large cargo shipments usually travel for weeks across the 
oceans before reaching their final destination, which makes them 
highly vulnerable to cyber-attacks as there is enough time to 
remove evidence of the crime (Jones, Tam and Papadaki, 2016).
The following is a list of the most important maritime 
cyber-attacks: 
1. Few companies providing security onboard ships sailing 
through “High Risk Area” (HRA) were subject to hacker attacks 
back in 2011. Pirates successfully accessed sensitive data on 
vessels movement, their cargo and insurance. Using that, they 
were able to plan their further actions and request ransom. Those 
attacks had the same scenario – “key log” malwares were used to 
record each keyboard press, and send the logs further to pirates’ 
e-mail addresses (Frodl, 2012).
2. Port of Antwerp in Belgium was under hacker attacks 
committed by sophisticated drug smugglers in the period 
between 2011. and 2013. Using malwares and, subsequently, 
on, other methods, the hackers were successfully finding out the 
location of cargo containers containing narcotics. Afterwards 
they used to send their own drivers to collect the goods before 
the real owner could come to pick up the container. The Port 
authorities realized that something was going on just after whole 
containers had started to disappear (Bateman, 2013).
3. Despite the fact that the main purpose of Automatic 
Identification System (AIS) is increase in safety, easier 
identification and communication at sea, a research (Balduzzi, 
Wilhoit and Pasta, 2014) shows that AIS has many deficiencies, 
especially in terms of cyber security because it is completely 
cyber unprotected. There were tests carried out to confirm such 
issues, during which false AIS symbols were generated on various 
locations around the world. The consequences which can result 
from a misuse of AIS are enormous. 
4. A group of students successfully proved weaknesses and 
imperfections of Global Positioning System (GPS). In 2013 they 
hacked the GPS signal on a private yacht and distributed false 
position data to navigational equipment. As the track-pilot was 
active, automatic correction of course had been initiated in order 
to put the yacht back on route (Vaas, 2013).
5. Jamming of the GPS signal can cause a lot of trouble for 
navigation and positioning, both ashore and at sea. As GPS is 
under the control of the USA, the representatives of the White 
House issued a diplomatic warning to North Korea, due to a strong 
jamming encountered in Seoul. At that time the  propagation of 
strong radio waves caused a lot of trouble to airplanes flying over 
the area affected (GPS World, 2016).
6. In 2014 hackers used malware to shut off an oil platform 
and completely disable it for a period of 19 days (Wagstaff, 2014).
7. In June 2017 the biggest container operator in the world 
“Maersk”, suffered an enormous cyber-attack. “NotPetya“ 
malware triggered a need for reinstallation of more than 4,000 
servers and 45,000 PCs. The company was forced to transport, 
load, and discharge containers without the IT support for 10 days 
(Cimpanu, 2018).
8. Also, in the summer of 2017,“Svitzer” company was a 
victim of data theft – over 5,000 e-mails with personal data 
were redirected to outside addresses. More than 400 employees 
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were endangered. The problem arose 10 months before it was 
discovered and then fixed within 5 hours. The investigation 
confirmed that messages had been redirected to the outside 
addresses but, when the mailboxes become full, the e-mails were 
returning as non-delivered (Bogle, 2018). 
9. Another gigantic company “COSCO” was a victim 
of „NotPetya“ malware in July 2018. During the attack, 
communication channels were disabled, first at port of Long 
Beach and then in the whole USA territory (Cimpanu, 2018). 
4. ATTACK FORMS
The Classification society “Lloyd Register” in (Lloyd’s 
Register, 2018) states that the number of cyber-attacks has 
increased by 27 % per year, while 86 % of companies were victims 
of cyber-attack during 2017. The same source states that 44 % 
of companies believe their IT system requires upgrade in order 
to meet cyber security requirements, especially because 39 % of 
those companies suffered attacks during 2017. 
According to another research (IHS Markit, 2018), the most 
significant maritime cyber problems are manifested in one of the 
following forms:
1. „Phishing“ is the most common form of cyber incident. 
Attacks can be classified in two groups – the first one known 
as social engineering and the second one based on malwares 
(Gupta et al., 2017). In the case of social engineering, the attackers 
try to cause harm via e-mail which seems harmless at a glance, 
or via fake web site. On the other hand, malware phishing uses 
malwares installed on client’s PC. 
This kind of threat is common onboard vessels in the form of 
e-mail. Usually e-mail contains a hyperlink to a fake web site 
where the user will, due to inattention or lack of knowledge, type 
personal details, such as username and password, to access their 
account. This usually happens when, due to being extremely 
busy, crew members do not pay attention to the e-mail content 
or the hyperlink. 
2. Malware is a „computer code written to steal or harm. It 
includes viruses, spyware, and ransomware. Sometimes malware 
only uses computing resources (e.g. memory), but at other times 
it can record your actions or send your personal and sensitive 
information to cyber criminals“ (Paulsen and Toth, 2016).
3. “Spear phishing” is a form of “phishing” and represents 
one way of unauthorized collection of personal and sensitive 
data. Hence the hacker performs a “spear phishing” attack 
in the following manner: he contacts person „A“ inside the 
company, introducing himself as person „B“, who is at the same 
time superior to person „A“. He uses fake e-mail address, but 
very similar to the company official’s one, attaching a file or a 
hyperlink to the e-mail. By clicking the file in the attachment or 
by opening the link, login details are shared, transactions are 
authorized, or whole company’s network becomes infected. 
Therefore person „A“ shares login details or passwords thinking 
that he is communicating with the superior. 
4. Identity fraud – cyber-attacks can be aimed exclusively at 
stealing identity in order to use it for further crimes. Identity fraud 
is commonly committed by using „Trojan“ malware. 
5. Ransomware is a kind of malware. A seemingly normal and 
harmless e-mail can cause a lot of trouble. Ransomware is usually 
in form of „.pdf“ or „.zip“ files attached to e-mail. By opening these 
files the system is brought to danger as the malware initiates 
denial of access to document or to the system. The solution is in 
paying off ransom in order to restore access to files or system. 
6. „Man in the middle“ (MITM/MIM) is a kind of malware 
which relies on SSL/TSL protocol weakness, being correspondent 
in communication between two network users (Čekerevac 
et al., 2017; Mallik et al., 2019). In such a case, downloading of 
important data occurs while users can rarely detect it. 
7. Data theft usually goes unnoticed or is discovered too 
late. Data is being copied or downloaded without authorization. 
Committing criminal activities by using ransomware and 
malware, unauthorized access results in data theft and data 
deletion in order to hide the traces or to cause a lot of harm to 
business (Borazjani, 2017). This is supported by the fact that over 
50,000 e-mails of “Svitzer” company were subject to data theft 
back in the summer of 2017 (Bogle, 2018).
5. HOW TO SOLVE A PROBLEM?
Issuing the „Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk 
Management” the IMO responded to an increase in cyber-attacks 
by accepting the NIST framework containing of five elements: 
identification, protection, detection, response, and recovery 
(International Maritime Organization, 2017). Similarly, BIMCO 
(BIMCO, 2017) defines the circle process base d on theNIST 
approach (Figure 3). 
Identification is a process of identification OF internal and 
external weaknesses or risks. It contains knowledge about: 
personnel and their abilities to recognize risks; systems; data and 
other elements that can cause a risk due to disruption of normal 
IT process within the company. 
Detection means that it is necessary to conduct activities in 
order to spot the cyber threat as soon as possible. Hence, early 
threat detection leads to early detection of malicious intentions 
followed by on-time steps which will limit the consequences to 
the part of the system, protecting the rest of it. 
Protection requires following of contingency plans in case 
of threat or incident, as well as procedures and measures to 
recover from the attack in good time. 
Response to threats depends on the development and 
implementation of plans and activities which will restore the 
system upon cyber-attack. 
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Recovery is the last phase which requires implementation of 
measures to restore the system and the data which were under 
attack. This phase precedes the first one – identification of risks 
and weaknesses. 
Notwithstanding the fact that these elements have a 
general character, they provide  clear guidelines to companies 
which are free to create their own procedures and solutions in 
order to satisfy their own needs. 
We believe that there are three basic considerations upon 
which cyber security measures must rely: 
1. Human resources – personnel should be aware of risks and 
have adequate skills and qualifications. Also, employees should 
be familiar with the procedures, levels of authorization, physical 
security barriers, and they should be well trained in risk response. 
2. Technology – adequate system design is a requirement. 
Software configuration should satisfy further inspection, 
verification, and testing processes.  
3. Processes – include management of systems and networks, 
management policies and procedures, audits, contracts with 
third parties etc.
It is for these reason that the cyber security battle is not 
dependent solely on IT. Hence, it should start at the top of the 
company with implementation of cyber security procedures 
through the SMS. That is the most important precondition for the 
future plan development, education and training of seafarers, 
Figure 3.
Cyber risk management (BIMCO, 2017).
as well as for creating  appropriate conditions for successful 
protection against attacks and threats.  
Every single user onboard, as well as ashore at the company 
headquarters, should be limited with user rights with regard to 
some information, data, or parts of the system. The reason which 
lies behind limitation of access and user rights is mainly referred 
to steps made due to lack of knowledge or unintentionally, 
causing the system to become vulnerable and exposed to data 
theft or similar incidents. 
IT network onboard is the crucial element of defense 
against cyber-attacks. However, the real disposition and 
protective measures onboard vessels are usually not as 
prescribed by international recommendations. Therefore 
the network configuration and its protective measures are 
of utmost importance, which can be achieved by following 
recommendations and company procedures. At first, the use of 
firewall to separate internal (safe) network from external (unsafe) 
network is crucial. 
Performing of security assessment will enable the company 
to spot its weaknesses and vulnerabilities and to minimize them 
to the maximum extent. Based on the remaining and unsolved 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities, it is necessary to develop 
preventive measures, as well as recovery measures, in case of a 
successful cyber-attack. 
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In order to meet all of the afore mentioned requirements, 
it is necessary to monitor obeying the procedures, tasks and 
activities, as well as to monitor personnel behaviour in relation to 
the usage of IT resources. 
Since there is an increasing number of systems onboard 
which are accessible from the company’s headquarters, such 
systems should be treated with special attention, protected with 
additional procedures which will enable safe and secure access 
whenever it is necessary. 
Implementation of anti-malware and anti-virus is a must, 
and there is no need to particularly underline it within this article. 
It is very common for the whole systems to get infected 
onboard ship by using infected USB drives. This can be classified 
as user’s insufficient knowledge. Companies should find a 
way to overcome such and similar occurrences – usually by 
implementation of online trainings provided by renowned 
companies  „VIDEOTEL“ or „SEAGULL“, or even by classification 
societies. Tanker shipping companies have widely accepted 
newly introduced „OCIMF” requirements by using „Tanker 
management and self-assessment“ (TMSA) tool (OCIMF, 2018). 
Employees’ education expenses are negligible in comparison to 
the costs which may arise in case of  a cyber-attack. 
There is also a need for introducing “Cyber Security Officer” 
(CySO) (Boyes, H. and Isbell, 2017). CySO should be delegated 
to perform cyber security assessment and to implement actual 
security plan, as well as to educate crew to respond to more and 
more frequent threats. Of course, CySO should be adequately 
educated and certified to conduct such a demanding task. 
6. CONCLUSION
Cyber threats, vessels, port terminals and other maritime 
systems evolve simultaneously. Negative effects of cyber-attack 
are evident not only onboard the victim vessel, but in a much 
wider sector including shipping companies, port terminals, 
interconnection systems etc. 
GPS signal jam causing the crude oil tanker to ground in 
dense fog is much more serious than the grounding itself, by 
far exceeding the average costs. In such a case, the oil spillage 
is bound to cause an ecological catastrophe. Apart from GPS 
imperfections and its misuse, this article has presented other 
unpleasant events with, in the majority of cases, serious 
consequences. 
Apart from the great attention which is already being 
given to maritime cyber security, much more should be done. 
Regulation is just one step towards the goal achievement. 
However, the personnel seems to present an even bigger 
problem than the regulation itself, because it often happens that 
the crew onboard, with minimum or no knowledge about this 
matter, inadvertently perform some tasks, frequently resulting in 
the system being exposed and open to attack. 
Awareness is a necessity in all business aspects – if there is 
no awareness among employees at the company headquarters, 
then all awareness onboard ship will not have a great impact. 
Sooner or later, the difference between successful and 
unsuccessful business companies will be in their sustainability in 
response to cyber-attacks. 
Our future work will be aimed at improving the efficiency 
of seafarers’ education related to minimizing the number of 
successful cyber-attacks onboard vessels. Special attention 
should be given to various forms of training which will become 
mandatory in the near future. The creation of comparative 
analyzes, assuming that companies abide by the new European 
Union “General Data Protection Regulation“, should provide 
answers as to what extent the maritime industry has successfully 
responded to new form of war – cyber threats. 
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